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Network utility price regulation in Australia in the pre-first world war years

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  • Malcolm Abbott

Abstract

Australia has a long history of privately owned utility price regulation, one that is little known. This price control was designed to restrain the market power of several utilities (gas, rail, tramways, electricity, and water). The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to establish what types of price control that were used in Australia in the utilities sector before the First World War and to determine the degree to which this price control influenced efficiency. As price levels in this era were set in legislation, the lack of flexibility led to less-than-optimal outcomes, and eventually and led to new approaches were developed after 1912 to the utilities that remained in private ownership, and in some cases influenced the movement in Australia towards government control.

Suggested Citation

  • Malcolm Abbott, 2024. "Network utility price regulation in Australia in the pre-first world war years," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 25(1), pages 3-18, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:crnind:v:25:y:2024:i:1:p:3-18
    DOI: 10.1177/17835917231225749
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Malcolm Abbott, 2013. "The Motivation and Effectiveness of Gas Industry Economic Regulation in New South Wales, 1912–39," Australian Economic History Review, Economic History Society of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 53(2), pages 167-186, July.
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