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Pro-government militias and civil war termination

Author

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  • Chelsea Estancona

    (2629University of South Carolina, USA)

  • Lindsay Reid

    (3507Gettysburg College, USA)

Abstract

Why do governments choose to fund pro-government militias (PGMs) if doing so could extend costly civil conflict? While PGMs are active in a majority of civil wars, their impact on conflict termination remains poorly understood. We argue that the choice to fund PGMs is a strategic one for states and part of their efforts to influence wartime dynamics and conflict termination. We hypothesize that PGMs’ impact on conflict termination is conditional on whether they are government funded. Government-funded PGMs help states to ward off costly negotiations and encourage the rebellion's gradual dissolution. Using competing risks analyses on civil wars ending between 1981 and 2007, we find robust evidence that PGM funding affects conflict outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Chelsea Estancona & Lindsay Reid, 2022. "Pro-government militias and civil war termination," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(3), pages 291-310, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:39:y:2022:i:3:p:291-310
    DOI: 10.1177/07388942211048419
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    References listed on IDEAS

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