Some Economics of Banking Reform
Where do we stand, five years on from the start of the crisis, on progress towards banking reform? Following a stock-take of current reform initiatives, the paper reviews some economics of public policy towards banks, in particular capital requirements and the role of structural regulation in making banking systems safer. Forms of separation between retail and investment banking are compared, notably ring-fencing and complete separation. The paper concludes with reflections on the wider European policy debate following the Liikanen Report. A central theme is that banking reform needs a welldesigned combination of policies towards loss-absorbency and structural reform
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Volume (Year): (2012)
Issue (Month): Lect. XIII ()
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000.
"Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
- Miles, David & Yang, Jing & Marcheggiano, Gilberto, 2011.
"Optimal Bank Capital,"
31, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England.
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