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Efficiency Of Control In Regional Self-Government Of The Slovak Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Vladimir SAGAT

    (Independent expert, 185, Lucatin, Banska Bystrica, Bratislava, Slovakia)

  • Milan KRAPEK

    (Mgr. PhD. Ambis Vysoká Skola, a.s., Lindnerova 575/1; 180 00, Praga 8, Czech Republic,)

  • Juraj NEMEC

    (Professor PhD., Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University Brno, Lipova 41a, 60200 Brno, Czech Republic and Faculty of Economics, Matej Bel University, Tajovskeho 10, 974 01 Banska Bystrica,)

Abstract

The importance of high quality public sector control is an obvious fact – without efficient and effective control system, the risk of wasting public funds is critical. The goal of this article was to evaluate efficiency of internal control systems on the level of regional self-administration in the Slovakia. The findings clearly document many problems related to the performance of regional control bodies and on this basis purposes and possible actions are proposed. From the point of view of "fiscal rules", the research, for example, pointed to an exceptionally poor situation in compliance with the rules and conditions of budgetary management in the Bystrica region in the period 2006-2009. The research also proves that one of the key problems of nonconceptual and non-transparent asset management of regions is confusing and disadvantageous asset sales. The quantitative analysis suggests that the efficiency (intensity) of the functioning of regional control systems does not have a direct impact on the monitored output indicators. The implemented DEA also indicates the low effectivity of the internal control systems of the regions. Our findings fully prove that there are no truly efficient systems of external and internal control at the level of self-governing regions in Slovakia. The factor of high autonomy of regions in the financial management and disposal of assets in connection with the identified high degree of failure of the regional control system generates a clear need to strengthen the system of internal control of regions, based on systemic and procedural changes.

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir SAGAT & Milan KRAPEK & Juraj NEMEC, 2021. "Efficiency Of Control In Regional Self-Government Of The Slovak Republic," REVISTA ADMINISTRATIE SI MANAGEMENT PUBLIC, Faculty of Administration and Public Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 2020(37), pages 6-26.
    • Handle: RePEc:rom:rampas:v:2020:y:2021:i:37:p:6-26
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    File URL: https://www.ramp.ase.ro/vol37/37-01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Sičáková-Beblavá Emília & Kollárik Martin & Sloboda Matúš, 2016. "Exploring the Determinants of Transparency of Slovak Municipalities," NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Sciendo, vol. 9(2), pages 121-145, December.
    4. Juraj Nemec & Beata Merickova & Frantisek Ochrana, 2008. "Introducing benchmarking in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," Public Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(5), pages 673-684, September.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues

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