Mechanisms for Incentive Regulation: Theory and Experiment
This article develops the theoretical properties of a new incentive mechanism for regulating a monopoly seller and reports the results of laboratory experimental tests of its behavioral properties. The design of the new mechanism draws upon the results of our earlier experimental research on the behavioral properties of two other mechanisms, one by Loeb and Magat (1979) and a second by Finsinger and Vogelsang (1981). As with Finsinger and Vogelsang, the new mechanism weakens Loeb and Magat's requirement that regulators have complete knowledge of market demand. The new mechanism, however, is not subject to the destabilizing, profit-destroying cycles of nonoptimal behavior observed with Finsinger and Vogelsang's.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 18 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|