On the Coordination of National Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union - Il coordinamento delle politiche fiscali nazionali in un’unione monetaria
In this paper we analyze the issue of cooperation among national fiscal authorities in a monetary union within the framework of their strategic interactions with the common monetary authority. We find that: a) in the lack of cooperation with the central bank, cooperation among fiscal authorities is not desirable; b) if the authorities have different targets, both fiscal leadership and monetary leadership result in a Pareto improvement with respect to the Nash outcome; however, the central bank is better off acting as a follower rather than as a leader; c) harmonization of targets makes policy coordination unnecessary, unless countries are hit by asymmetric shocks: in this case,either cooperation among national fiscal authorities or state-contingency of targets are necessary to obtain an efficient outcome. These findings are applied to the EMU case. - In questo lavoro analizziamo il problema della cooperazione tra autorità fiscali nazionali in un’unione monetaria nell’ambito delle relazioni strategiche con l’autorità monetaria comune. Troviamo che: a) in mancanza di cooperazione con la banca centrale, la cooperazione tra le autorità fiscali non è desiderabile; b) se le autorità hanno target diversi, sia la leadership fiscale, sia la leadership monetaria comportano un miglioramento paretiano rispetto all’equilibrio di Nash; tuttavia, la banca centrale è in una situazione migliore se agisce da follower piuttosto che da leader; c) l’armonizzazione dei target rende superfluo il coordinamento, a meno che i paesi membri dell’unione siano colpiti da shock asimmetrici: in tal caso, diventano necessari per ottenere un risultato efficiente o la cooperazione tra autorità fiscali nazionali o target state contingent. Questi risultati sono applicati al caso europeo.
Volume (Year): 63 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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