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Ukrainian Government Bureaucracy: Benefits and Costs for the Society

Author

Listed:
  • Victor Fedosov
  • Tetiana Paientko

Abstract

Government bureaucracy efficiency, and its attending cost for society, is one of the gravest issues currently facing Ukraine. The low efficiency of Ukrainian government bureaucracy is caused by a merger of bureaucracy, political power, and large, manipulating business interests. As a result, Ukraine faces a significantly depressed economy, a high level of corruption, low property rights protection, and a pervasive lack of trust in the government in general. In order to understand the true costs and benefits of government bureaucracy for the Ukrainian society, a methodology of calculating bureaucracy specifically for Ukraine was developed. Previously unused indicators were added to provide greater accuracy. The inefficiency of Ukrainian government bureaucracy was determined categorically. Paths to the improvement of Ukrainian government bureaucracy efficiency were suggested.

Suggested Citation

  • Victor Fedosov & Tetiana Paientko, 2017. "Ukrainian Government Bureaucracy: Benefits and Costs for the Society," Business and Management Studies, Redfame publishing, vol. 3(2), pages 8-19, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:rfa:bmsjnl:v:3:y:2017:i:2:p:8-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Paientko Tetiana & Oparin Valeriy, 2020. "Reducing the Tax Burden in Ukraine: Changing Priorities," Journal of Management and Business Administration. Central Europe, Sciendo, vol. 28(3), pages 98-126, September.

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