IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Betriebsverhandlungen in Frankreich: Die Bevollmaechtigung von nicht gewerkschaftlich organisierten Mitarbeitern (Company Bargaining in France: The Case of the Proxy Representation of Non-union Employees)

Listed author(s):
  • Jens Thoemmes
Registered author(s):

    Mit dieser Ausarbeitung moechten wir die Betriebsverhandlungen in Frankreich betrachten und besonders auf einen Aspekt der industriellen Beziehungen Bezug nehmen, der von der soziologischen Forschung bisher nur wenig behandelt wurde. Die Beauftragung eines Angestellten mit dem Aushandeln einer Betriebsvereinbarung mit dem Arbeitsgeber stellt das Privileg der Gewerkschaftsvertreter in Frage, die grundsaetzlich das Monopol dieser Verhandlungen haben. Einerseits fuehrte diese Praxis zum Abschluss zahlreicher Vereinbarungen im Rahmen des Gesetzes ueber die 35-Stunden-Woche (1998-2002). Andererseits weicht dieses Verfahren von den traditionellen Regeln ab. Mit diesem Aufsatz moechten wir zeigen, inwiefern die Beauftragung nicht gewerkschaftlich organisierter Mitarbeiter „neu“ ist. Sie fuehrt zu Vereinbarungen, die nicht als „minderwertig“ betrachtet werden koennen. Wir werden im Gegenteil erklaeren, warum eine grosse Zahl dieser Vereinbarungen zu guenstigeren Arbeitsbedingungen fuehrt, als die klassischen Abkommen. Unter Hinzuziehung der franzoesischen Theorie der sozialen Regulierung, moechten wir hierbei die Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung vorlegen und interpretieren. (With this text we want to analyze collective bargaining in France and especially one aspect of industrial relations that has been very little studied by sociological research. As a result of national negotiations in 1995, proxy representation has helped to give a non-unionized employees of the company the power to be counterparty to conclude company agreements with their an employers for concluding an agreement. This calls challenges the privilege of union representatives in question, who in principle have the a monopoly of these such negotiations. On the one hand, this practice led to the conclusion of many agreements in the framework of the law on the 35-hour week law (1998-2002). On the other hand, this procedure differs from the traditional rules and regulations. In this paper we want to show why this method is new and original: it leads to agreements that cannot be regarded as 'cheap' or 'give away'. We will explain in the opposite, why, on the contrary, a large number many of these arrangements lead to better working conditions than the traditional agreements. With the use of Using the French theory of social regulation, we want to present and interpret the results of an empirical study.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Rainer Hampp Verlag in its journal Industrielle Beziehungen.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 262-289

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:rai:indbez:doi_10.1688/1862-0035_indb_2011_04_thoemmes
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Postal: Rainer Hampp Verlag, Journals, Vorderer Lech 35, 86150 Augsburg, Germany. A subscripton is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available at
    Web: Email:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rai:indbez:doi_10.1688/1862-0035_indb_2011_04_thoemmes. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rainer Hampp)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.