IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Ungewissheit als Grenze von Interessenbargaining in industriellen Beziehungen (How Uncertainty Acts as a Boundary to Interest Bargaining in Industrial Relations)

Listed author(s):
  • Martin Schroeder
Registered author(s):

    Die Literatur ueber betriebliche Buendnisse und Konzessionsverhandlungen setzt voraus, dass Geschaeftsleitungen wissen, wie sie ihre Interessen verfolgen koennen und dazu Zugestaendnisse von Arbeitnehmervertretern verlangen. Wirtschaftliche Entscheidungen finden jedoch unter Ungewissheit statt: Eine Geschaeftsleitung weiss beispielsweise nicht, ob sich eine Verlagerungsandrohung als wirtschaftlich rational erweisen wird. Ob Arbeitnehmervertreter sich gegenueber einer Verlagerung zu Konzessionen bereit erklaeren, haengt somit nicht direkt von objektiven Wirtschaftsdaten oder Machtverhaeltnissen ab, sondern von deren Interpretation. Wie eine Situation interpretiert wird, haengt wiederum davon ab, welche wirtschaftlichen, aber auch anderen, Argumente die Verhandlungspartner als angemessen anerkennen. Anders als oft impliziert, findet darum nicht nur ein „bargaining“ zwischen dem statt, wovon die Geschaeftsleitung weiss, dass es ihr Interesse maximiert und dem, wovon die Arbeitnehmervertreter wissen, dass es ihr Interesse maximiert. Thema der Verhandlungen ist auch, was ueberhaupt als interessenfoerderlich zu gelten hat. Am Beispiel von zwei Unternehmen veranschaulicht dieser Artikel dies, in dem er zeigt, wie zwei Geschaeftsleitungen eine aehnliche wirtschaftliche Entscheidung einmal als rational und einmal als irrational konstruierten. (The literature about concession bargaining implies that the management of a company knows how to pursue its interests optimally and that it demands corresponding concessions from labor representatives. However, economic decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty. Management cannot usually calculate how optimally to pursue its interests: it is impossible to calculate whether a relocation will be successful, to cite a well-documented example. Whether one side or the other makes concessions is therefore not a question of objective economic data or power relations, but of their interpretation. How a situation is interpreted in turn depends on what arguments are accepted as appropriate. In contrast to the conventional assumptions in the literature, I stress that rather than simply bargaining about well-defined and fixed interests, management and labor also discuss and redefine what they consider to be in their own and their opponents’ interest. To illustrate this point I cite two companies that chose opposite strategies under similar economic circumstances and justified their actions in each case as being economically rational.)

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Rainer Hampp Verlag in its journal Industrielle Beziehungen.

    Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 261-283

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:rai:indbez:doi_10.1688/1862-0035_indb_2010_03_schroeder
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Postal: Rainer Hampp Verlag, Journals, Vorderer Lech 35, 86150 Augsburg, Germany. A subscripton is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available at
    Web: Email:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rai:indbez:doi_10.1688/1862-0035_indb_2010_03_schroeder. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rainer Hampp)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.