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Cohérence des politiques de développement de l'Union européenne

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  • Paul Hoebink

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  • Paul Hoebink, 2000. "Cohérence des politiques de développement de l'Union européenne," Revue Tiers Monde, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(164), pages 885-902.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:rtiers:tiers_1293-8882_2000_num_41_164_1443
    DOI: 10.3406/tiers.2000.1443
    Note: DOI:10.3406/tiers.2000.1443
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
    2. Scott McDonald, 1996. "Reform of the EU's Sugar Policies and the ACP Countries," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 14(2), pages 131-150, June.
    3. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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