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Un modèle de politique monétaire avec aléas stratégiques


  • Philippe Mongin
  • Pierre-André Chiappori


[eng] A model of monetary policy with strategical uncertainty. Pierre-André Chiappori., Philippe Mongin. In the carrent Rational Expectations literature, monetary growth is part of the uncertainly facing the agent, which is thought of as probabilistic in character ; therefore, monetary growth is described by an exogenous random variable. The first aim of this paper is to criticize this apparently inoccuous assumption. It is shown that it does not satisfactorily account for the way in which monetary policy decisions are actually made. The second aim of the paper is to build up a simple model in which the government is given the role of a true rational agent on a par with the private sector individuals. Thus, monetary growth is an endogeneous variable in a game the players of which are the monetary authorities on the one hand, a Lucas-type producer on the other hand. Applying various equilibrium concepts to the simple and the repeated games, the paper eventually supports the Monetarist daim that money is neutral, but disprove the standard Monetarist concept of a « cure against inflation », on the grounds that fighting inflation by monetary means only will generally fail. In short, inflation is a monetary problem, but monetary policies will not always surfice to reduce it. [fre] Les modèles d'Anticipations Rationnelles appliqués à la politique monétaire suppo­sent habituellement que l'émission de monnaie est perçue par les agents comme un aléa probabilisable, donc exogène. Nous critiquons cette formalisation, en montrant qu'elle recouvre en fait des hypothèses très discutables sur le contexte stratégique dans lequel sont prises les décisions de politique économique. Nous proposons enfin un modèle simple, qui rend à l'Etat la capacité d'action stratégique que lui dénient les modèles d'Anticipations Rationnelles : pour cela, nous représentons la création monétaire comme le résultat d'un jeu opposant la Banque Centrale et un produc­teur représentatif du secteur privé. Le modèle, qui fait intervenir la technique des jeux répétés, confirme la thèse monétariste d'inefficacité de la politique monétaire, mais montre que celle-ci n'est plus suffisante pour assurer le succès d'une o curé désinflationniste » fondée sur des moyens purement monétaires.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Mongin & Pierre-André Chiappori, 1984. "Un modèle de politique monétaire avec aléas stratégiques," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 35(5), pages 831-870.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1984_num_35_5_408809
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1984.408809

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Polemarchakis, H. M. & Weiss, L., 1977. "On the desirability of a "totally random" monetary policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 345-350, August.
    2. Taylor, John B, 1982. "Establishing Credibility: A Rational Expectations Viewpoint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 81-85, May.
    3. Sargent, Thomas J. & Wallace, Neil, 1976. "Rational expectations and the theory of economic policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 169-183, April.
    4. Taylor, John B, 1979. "Estimation and Control of a Macroeconomic Model with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1267-1286, September.
    5. Phelps, Edmund S & Taylor, John B, 1977. "Stabilizing Powers of Monetary Policy under Rational Expectations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 163-190, February.
    6. Bernard Walliser, 1982. "Equilibres et anticipations," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(4), pages 594-638.
    7. Michael Spence, 1976. "Competition in Salaries, Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 51-74.
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