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Public Policy towards Science : Picking Stars or Spreading the Wealth ?

  • Ashish Arora
  • Alfonso Gambardella

[fre] Ce papier fournit un nouveau fondement rationnel pour le financement public de la recherche scientifique. Nous montrons que les financements industriels de la recherche scientifique conduisent à une allocation de ressources privilégiant de façon excessive les scientifiques ayant une réputation ancienne très forte (les « étoiles »). Ceci, est dû à ce que l'industrie a moins d'incitation que la société à financer des chercheurs simplement en vue de tester leur capacité. [eng] This paper provides another rationale for public funding of scientific research. We argue that industry funding of scientific research will lead to an excessive allocation of resources to scientists with greater past reputation (the « stars »). This is because industry will have fewer incentives than society as a whole to fund researchers (e.g. young people) just for the sake of assessing whether they are « able » or not. Not only will public agencies fund less prominent researchers as well, but we show with a simple model that this strategy is efficient in the long run.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie industrielle.

Volume (Year): 79 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 63-75

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Handle: RePEc:prs:recind:rei_0154-3229_1997_num_79_1_1653
Note: DOI:10.3406/rei.1997.1653
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