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Enchères et externalités

  • Philippe Jehiel

[fre] Enchères et externalités par Philippe Jehiel . On considère la vente d'un bien induisant des effets externes entre acheteurs au sens où un acheteur n'est pas indifférent si le bien reste invendu ou s'il devient la propriété d'un concurrent. Ce papier résume plusieurs articles sur le sujet en montrant comment la présence d' externalités permet d'expliquer des phénomènes tels que le comportement stratégique des acheteurs vis-à-vis de la participation à l'enchère ou encore la possibilité du vendeur d'extraire de l'argent d'agents qui n'achèteront pas le bien ou encore l'émergence de phases d'immobilisme dans les négociations. On considérera aussi brièvement le cas où le bien peut être revendu après l'acquisition. [eng] Auctions and Externalities by Philippe Jehiel . We consider the sales of a good that produces external effects between the buyers in that an individual buyer is not indifferent as to whether or not the good is sold or whether it comes to be owned by a competitor. This paper reviews several articles dealing with this topic and shows how externalities can explain such phenomena as buyers' strategic behaviour at auctions, the seller's ability to get money from agents who will not buy the good and stalling in negotiations. We also deal briefly with cases where the good being acquired may be resold.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 132 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 83-92

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5901
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5901
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecop

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  1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-35, November.
  2. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-29, September.
  3. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
  4. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1997. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  6. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1999. "Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 971-91, October.
  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu, 1993. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with "Externalities"," Discussion Paper Serie B 234, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
  9. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-39, December.
  10. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
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