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Enchères et externalités

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  • Philippe Jehiel

Abstract

[eng] Auctions and Externalities by Philippe Jehiel . We consider the sales of a good that produces external effects between the buyers in that an individual buyer is not indifferent as to whether or not the good is sold or whether it comes to be owned by a competitor. This paper reviews several articles dealing with this topic and shows how externalities can explain such phenomena as buyers' strategic behaviour at auctions, the seller's ability to get money from agents who will not buy the good and stalling in negotiations. We also deal briefly with cases where the good being acquired may be resold. [fre] Enchères et externalités par Philippe Jehiel . On considère la vente d'un bien induisant des effets externes entre acheteurs au sens où un acheteur n'est pas indifférent si le bien reste invendu ou s'il devient la propriété d'un concurrent. Ce papier résume plusieurs articles sur le sujet en montrant comment la présence d' externalités permet d'expliquer des phénomènes tels que le comportement stratégique des acheteurs vis-à-vis de la participation à l'enchère ou encore la possibilité du vendeur d'extraire de l'argent d'agents qui n'achèteront pas le bien ou encore l'émergence de phases d'immobilisme dans les négociations. On considérera aussi brièvement le cas où le bien peut être revendu après l'acquisition.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Jehiel, 1998. "Enchères et externalités," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 83-92.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5901
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5901
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1321-1335, November.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1996. "How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 814-829, September.
    3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1999. "Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 971-991.
    4. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
    5. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
    6. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1995. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 619-637.
    7. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2000. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 768-791, Winter.
    8. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
    9. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    10. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
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