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Une critique de l'économie politique néo-institutionnaliste du contrat de travail

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  • Liêm Hoang-Ngoc

Abstract

[fre] Le courant néo-institutionnaliste anglo-saxon est en passe de devenir, aux yeux de nombreux économistes, la théorie unifiée des institutions de l'économie. Ce courant prétend rendre la théorie économique plus réaliste sans s'écarter de la rigueur méthodologique néo-classique en introduisant, au sein du programme de recherche orthodoxe, des hypothèses de rationalité limitée et d'information imparfaite, ainsi que des hypothèses secondaires concernant, notamment, la nature des actifs. Il vise notamment ainsi à produire une théorie de la firme en réinterprétant l'hypothèse marxiste de la force de travail comme objet de l'échange sur le marché du travail. Le maintien d'une problématique de l'efficience, en dépit de l'adoption d'hypothèses cognitives imparfaites, amène nombre des auteurs de ce courant à conclure à l'efficience des arrangements institutionnels en place. [eng] A Critique of the Neo-institutionnalist Theories of Labor Contract. . The Anglo-Saxon neo-institutionnalist theories are sometimes regarded as prefiguring a general theory of the economic institutions. Thank to the hypotheses of bounded rationality and of imperfect information, combined with secondary hypotheses such as the degree of specificity of assets, they would bring about a more realistic representation, though as much rigourous as the neoclassical one. In this perspective, they aim at building a theory of the firm that allows both for the marxist thesis of labour force as the matter of the exchange on the labour market and for the idea according to which the different types of contracts on the labour market are efficient. But this idea is in contradiction with the idea of an imperfect cognition.

Suggested Citation

  • Liêm Hoang-Ngoc, 1998. "Une critique de l'économie politique néo-institutionnaliste du contrat de travail," Cahiers d'Économie Politique, Programme National Persée, vol. 33(1), pages 81-106.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:caecpo:cep_0154-8344_1998_num_33_1_1237
    DOI: 10.3406/cep.1998.1237
    Note: DOI:10.3406/cep.1998.1237
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