IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prg/jnlpep/v2006y2006i2id280p113-134.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Institutional Conditions of Monetary Policy Conduct in the Czech Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Petr Sedláček

Abstract

This paper tries to assess the conditions under which the CNB operates. Using a basic framework suggested by Mishkin (2000), the aim is to find out whether the central bank is able to conduct high-quality monetary policy. First, general principles that central banks should follow to succeed in their pursuit of monetary goals are theoretically introduced. Then, these theoretical principles are looked at in the Czech context. Issues of the strictness and suitability of concrete monetary policy of the CNB will not be dealt with, rather institutional circumstances that potentially allow successful policy are at the centre of this paper. It is concluded that the CNB is functioning in a moderately good environment, but still much room for improvement does exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Petr Sedláček, 2006. "Institutional Conditions of Monetary Policy Conduct in the Czech Republic," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2006(2), pages 113-134.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2006:y:2006:i:2:id:280:p:113-134
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.vse.cz/polek/download.php?jnl=pep&pdf=280.pdf
    Download Restriction: free of charge

    File URL: http://www.vse.cz/pep/280
    Download Restriction: free of charge

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. International Monetary Fund, 2002. "Czech Republic; Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes—Fiscal Transparency, Banking Supervision, Insurance Regulation, Securities Regulation, Payment Systems, and Monetary and Financial Polic," IMF Staff Country Reports 02/169, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Thomas I. Palley, 2003. "The Backward--Bending Phillips Curve And The Minimum Unemployment Rate Of Inflation: Wage Adjustment With Opportunistic Firms," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(1), pages 35-50, January.
    3. Allsop, Christopher & Vines, David, 2000. "The Assessment: Macroeconomic Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(4), pages 1-32, Winter.
    4. Fischer, Stanley, 1995. "Central-Bank Independence Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 201-206, May.
    5. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    6. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
    7. M J Oliver, 2001. "In Search of a Nominal Anchor," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 6(1), pages 33-46, March.
    8. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary policy; independence; accountability; central bank; institution; price stability; benchmark;

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2006:y:2006:i:2:id:280:p:113-134. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frantisek Sokolovsky). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/uevsecz.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.