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Doctrine Of Public Good In Banking Versus State Intervention

Author

Listed:
  • Piotr Masiukiewicz

    (Warsaw School of Economics, Poland)

Abstract

This article has the following thesis: changes in banking and the role of banks in real economy in recent years give an argument for treating banks as a public good. Banks received great support from governments as a result of the subprime crisis. G-20 and European Commission recommended new regulations for this sector after the crisis. As a consequence of banking development, more than 90% of the population use banking services in many countries. New social functions of banks have appeared. Doctrines about recovery and government support for banks were changed in parallel (e.g. LoLR). Presently, there are some arguments for recognition of public good doctrine in banking such as: a very big area for state regulation, state banking supervision, state system of deposits insurance, realization of task delegated by the state, social responsibility of banks and others. These arguments confirm that banks’ activity has a particular importance for the society and the economy, and would be public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Piotr Masiukiewicz, 2015. "Doctrine Of Public Good In Banking Versus State Intervention," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 10(1), pages 55-67, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:pes:ierequ:v:10:y:2015:i:1:p:55-67
    DOI: 10.12775/EQUIL.2015.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Piotr Masiukiewicz, 2010. "Crisis Threat And Banking Reform Trends," Perspectives of Innovation in Economics and Business (PIEB), Prague Development Center, vol. 6(3), pages 52-56, October.
    2. James, Christopher, 1991. "The Losses Realized in Bank Failures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1223-1242, September.
    3. Patrick A. McNutt, 2002. "The Economics of Public Choice, Second Edition," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1889.
    4. Masiukiewicz, Piotr, 2010. "Crisis threat and banking reform trends," Perspectives of Innovations, Economics and Business (PIEB), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 6(3), pages 1-5, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bankruptcy; bank; crisis; financial institution; public good;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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