IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Corporate Governance, Illiquidity, and Valuation Issues in Privately-Owned Corporations

  • Chenchuramaiah T. Bathala

    (Cleveland State University)

  • Oswald D. Bowlin

    (Texas Tech University)

  • William P. Dukes

    (Texas Tech University)

Registered author(s):

    Investors in private corporations face unique problems relating to corporate control, illiquidity and valuation of securities. In this research, we survey a large sample of US corporations. Our sample includes both private and public firms. Major findings of our research are as follows: Private firms use written shareholder agreements for safeguarding ownership interests and dividend payments. Family owned firms dominate the ownership structure of private firms. Insiders of private firms own a much larger proportion of common stock than insiders in public firms, and the CEOs of private firms often happen to be the largest stockholders.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://jefsite.org/RePEc/pep/journl/jef-2003-08-1-b-bathala.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management in its journal Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures.

    Volume (Year): 8 (2003)
    Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
    Pages: 1-30

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:pep:journl:v:8:y:2003:i:1:p:1-30
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 24255 Pacific Coast Hwy, Malibu CA
    Web page: http://bschool.pepperdine.edu/jef

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
    2. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    3. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November.
    4. Easterbrook, Frank H, 1984. "Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 650-59, September.
    5. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold B., 1979. "On financial contracting : An analysis of bond covenants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 117-161, June.
    6. Bennedsen, Morten & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2000. "The balance of power in closely held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 113-139.
    7. William P. Dukes, 2001. "Where Do We Stand on Closely-Held Firm Valuation?," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 6(1), pages 129-55 , Spring.
    8. Stewart C. Myers, 2000. "Outside Equity," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1005-1037, 06.
    9. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pep:journl:v:8:y:2003:i:1:p:1-30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Craig Everett)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.