Corporate Governance, Illiquidity, and Valuation Issues in Privately-Owned Corporations
Investors in private corporations face unique problems relating to corporate control, illiquidity and valuation of securities. In this research, we survey a large sample of US corporations. Our sample includes both private and public firms. Major findings of our research are as follows: Private firms use written shareholder agreements for safeguarding ownership interests and dividend payments. Family owned firms dominate the ownership structure of private firms. Insiders of private firms own a much larger proportion of common stock than insiders in public firms, and the CEOs of private firms often happen to be the largest stockholders.
Volume (Year): 8 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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