IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/jbkreg/v13y2012i4p265-299.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Just how big is the too-big-to-fail problem?

Author

Listed:
  • James R Barth
  • Apanard (Penny) Prabha
  • Phillip Swagel

Abstract

The idea of banks too big to fail (TBTF) is not new. Indeed, it has been three decades since the first TBTF bailout owing to concerns about serious and widespread financial repercussions. Since then, of course, big banks have grown much bigger and have become increasingly complex, both in the United States and elsewhere. In this article, we put the issue of TBTF in US historical and quantitative perspective, and assess the potential impacts of recent regulatory changes. The developments relating to the TBTF problem based on a global perspective are also examined. The measures taken since the financial crisis of 2007–2009 – including the Basel III regulatory reforms, domestic regulations such as the Dodd–Frank Act and the designation of global systemically important banks – have distinct purposes but also complement one another, to the extent that they are successful. Our analysis points out that despite the recent regulatory changes the future of TBTF remains unclear, but it is likely that it will be different from the past.

Suggested Citation

  • James R Barth & Apanard (Penny) Prabha & Phillip Swagel, 2012. "Just how big is the too-big-to-fail problem?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 13(4), pages 265-299, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:13:y:2012:i:4:p:265-299
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jbr/journal/v13/n4/pdf/jbr201213a.pdf
    File Function: Link to full text PDF
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jbr/journal/v13/n4/full/jbr201213a.html
    File Function: Link to full text HTML
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Barth, James R. & Prabha, Apanard Penny, 2014. "An Analysis of Resolving Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Throughout the United States," Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, Mid-Continent Regional Science Association, vol. 44(1).
    2. Leo Haan & Jan Kakes, 2020. "European banks after the global financial crisis: peak accumulated losses, twin crises and business models," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(3), pages 197-211, September.
    3. Del Viva, Luca & Kasanen, Eero & Saunders, Anthony & Trigeorgis, Lenos, 2021. "Is bailout insurance and tail risk priced in bank equities?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    4. Ozili, Peterson K, 2022. "Difficult issues in financial regulation for financial stability," MPRA Paper 115783, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Leo Haan & Jan Kakes, 0. "European banks after the global financial crisis: peak accumulated losses, twin crises and business models," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 0, pages 1-15.
    6. Lapteacru, Ion, 2017. "Market power and risk of Central and Eastern European banks: Does more powerful mean safer?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 46-59.
    7. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Song, Liang & Yeung, Bernard, 2015. "What determines bank-specific variations in bank stock returns? Global evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 312-324.
    8. Koresh Galil & Margalit Samuel & Offer Moshe Shapir & Wolf Wagner, 2023. "Bailouts and the modeling of bank distress," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 7-30, February.
    9. ap Gwilym, Rhys & Kanas, Angelos & Molyneux, Philip, 2013. "U.S. prompt corrective action and bank risk," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 239-257.
    10. James R. Barth & Clas Wihlborg, 2017. "Too big to fail: Measures, remedies, and consequences for efficiency and stability," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(4), pages 175-245, November.
    11. Badarau, Cristina & Lapteacru, Ion, 2020. "Bank risk, competition and bank connectedness with firms: A literature review," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    12. Satish Thosar & Bradley Schwandt, 2019. "Has ‘Too Big To Fail’ Been Solved? A Longitudinal Analysis of Major U.S. Banks," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-14, February.
    13. Ernaningsih, Indria & Smaoui, Houcem & Ben Salah, Ines, 2024. "Competition, regulation, and systemic risk in dual banking systems," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PA), pages 1087-1103.
    14. Gao, Yu & Liao, Scott & Wang, Xue, 2018. "Capital markets’ assessment of the economic impact of the Dodd–Frank Act on systemically important financial firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 204-223.
    15. Kozubovska, Mariolia, 2017. "Breaking up big banks," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 198-219.
    16. Maria Celia López-Penabad & Ana Iglesias-Casal & José Fernando Silva Neto, 2021. "Competition and Financial Stability in the European Listed Banks," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(3), pages 21582440211, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:13:y:2012:i:4:p:265-299. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.