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Reliability of Risk Management: Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-Protection Reconsidered

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Briys

    (Groupe HEC, Jouy-en-Josas, France)

  • Harris Schlesinger

    (University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA, 35487)

  • J.-Matthias Graf v. d. Schulenburg

    (University of Hannover, Hannover, FRG)

Abstract

This paper examines the three main tools of risk management in a setting where reliability cannot be guaranteed. Thus, for example, insurers might be insolvent, sprinkler systems might be inoperative and alarm systems might be faulty. These types of nonreliability are shown to have significant consequences for risk management. In particular, the relationships between increased risk aversion and the use of the various risk management tools do not carry over from models with full reliability. Moreover, the well-known result of Ehrlich and Becker, that market insurance and self-insurance are substitutes, is shown to fail in the presence of nonreliability risk. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1991) 16, 45–58. doi:10.1007/BF00942856

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Briys & Harris Schlesinger & J.-Matthias Graf v. d. Schulenburg, 1991. "Reliability of Risk Management: Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-Protection Reconsidered," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 16(1), pages 45-58, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:16:y:1991:i:1:p:45-58
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:socmed:v:185:y:2017:i:c:p:147-157 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Christian Gollier & James Hammitt & Nicolas Treich, 2013. "Risk and choice: A research saga," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 129-145, October.
    3. Ozlem Ozdemir, 2007. "Valuation of Self-Insurance and Self-Protection under Ambiguity: Experimental Evidence," Jena Economic Research Papers 2007-034, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    4. repec:eee:eecrev:v:101:y:2018:i:c:p:230-249 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Courbage, Christophe & Rey, Béatrice & Treich, Nicolas, 2013. "Prevention and precaution," TSE Working Papers 13-445, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
    7. Daniel R. Petrolia & Joonghyun Hwang & Craig E. Landry & Keith H. Coble, 2015. "Wind Insurance and Mitigation in the Coastal Zone," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 91(2), pages 272-295.
    8. Machina, Mark J, 2000. "Payoff Kinks in Preferences Over Lotteries," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7vn7d2hs, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    9. Constantin ANGHELACHE & Mario G.R. PAGLIACCI & Emilia STANCIU & Cristina SACALÃ, 2016. "Essential aspects regarding the optimal prevention," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 64(1), pages 38-42, January.
    10. François Pannequin & Anne Corcos & Claude Montmarquette, 2016. "Behavioral foundations of the substitutability between insurance and self-insurance: An experimental study," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-12, CIRANO.
    11. Huang, Rachel J., 2012. "Ambiguity aversion, higher-order risk attitude and optimal effort," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 338-345.

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