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The Opportunity for Conspiracy in Asset Markets Organized with Dealer Intermediaries

  • Cason, Timothy N

This article reports an asset market experiment in which asymmetrically informed traders transact through competing dealers. Dealers face a classic adverse selection problem because some traders have private information regarding the asset value while other traders are uninformed. When dealers cannot communicate outside the market, they price the asset competitively and the market is generally informationally efficient. When dealers communicate privately between periods, they collude successfully to widen spreads and increase profit. Another treatment permits traders to post limit orders, while still allowing dealers to communicate. Limit orders restore informational efficiency and narrow spreads but cause dealers to earn negative trading profits. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

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Article provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 13 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 385-416

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Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:13:y:2000:i:2:p:385-416
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