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The Dollar Profits to Insider Trading
[Information networks: evidence from illegal insider trading tips]

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Cziraki
  • Jasmin Gider

Abstract

This article studies insider trading quantities and dollar profits to measure the benefits insiders extract from their superior information. Dollar profits are economically small for a typical insider, the median insider earning $464 per year. The correlation between dollar profits and percentage returns is moderate, because returns are negatively correlated with trade size and frequency. We show that these correlations vary with proxies for insider preferences, firm-level monitoring, and regulatory scrutiny. As a consequence, variables that predict percentage returns fail to predict dollar profits, and past dollar profits are negatively related to future returns. Our work suggests that dollar profits are a better measure for corporate governance applications of insider trading.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Cziraki & Jasmin Gider, 2021. "The Dollar Profits to Insider Trading [Information networks: evidence from illegal insider trading tips]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 25(5), pages 1547-1580.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:25:y:2021:i:5:p:1547-1580.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfab010
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Akey, Pat & Grégoire, Vincent & Martineau, Charles, 2022. "Price revelation from insider trading: Evidence from hacked earnings news," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1162-1184.
    2. Akey, Pat & Grégoire, Vincent & Martineau, Charles, 2021. "Price Revelation from Insider Trading: Evidence from Hacked Earnings News," SocArXiv qe6tu, Center for Open Science.
    3. Chen, Shenglan & Ma, Hui & Wu, Qiang & Zhang, Hao, 2023. "Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    4. Contreras, Harold & Korczak, Adriana & Korczak, Piotr, 2023. "Religion and insider trading profits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 149(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insider trading; Trading profits; Corporate governance; Executive compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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