Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems
This article reconciles the psychological notion of bonuses and penalties as incentive devices with an economic view of incentives. An objective definition of bonus and penalty schemes is presented and shown to correspond to equilibrium in a model of moral hazard and probabilistic monitoring. The model implies that middle-management and other nonproduction jobs are appropriate for bonus-type incentive contracts, whereas in either unskilled jobs or aspects of highly skilled jobs that require diligence but no skill, penalty incentive schemes are predicted. We argue that our model illuminates an internal contradiction in the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky. We also argue that Japanese manufacturing systems have inherent incentive properties that elicit a high level of diligence from factory workers. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 10 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://jleo.oupjournals.org/
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:1:p:1-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.