Bonus and Penalty Schemes as Equilibrium Incentive Devices, with Application to Manufacturing Systems
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- Marchegiani, Lucia & Reggiani, Tommaso & Rizzolli, Matteo, 2016.
"Loss averse agents and lenient supervisors in performance appraisal,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 183-197.
- Lucia Marchegiani & Tommaso Reggiani & Matteo Rizzolli, 2016. "Loss Averse Agents and Lenient Supervisors in Performance Appraisal," CERBE Working Papers wpC11, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.
- David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011.
"Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1823, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2012.
- David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen, 2011. "Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000270, David K. Levine.
- Lucia Marchegiani & Tommaso Reggiani & Matteo Rizzolli, 2013. "Severity vs. Leniency Bias in Performance Appraisal: Experimental evidence," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS01, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
- Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," Working Papers 883, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Joaquim Vergés, 2010. "Incentive schemes for executive officers when forecasts matter," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(5), pages 339-352.
- repec:spr:joptap:v::y::i::d:10.1007_s10957-018-1273-x is not listed on IDEAS
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