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Impact of Schistosomiasis on Rice Output and Farm Inputs in Mali


  • Audibert, Martine
  • Etard, Jean-Francois


Using a quasi-experiment design, the economic impact of schistosomiasis was studied in 412 rice-grower households in Mali. Two groups of seven villages were formed, one a treated group and one an untreated group, after pair-matching by geographical zone and irrigation type. Effect of treatment was assessed according to economic output (paddy yield) and five resource variables (family and hired labour productivity, family and hired labour intensity and farm size). This study shows that changes in health have no direct effect on rice production, but affect the household's use of its labour resources and its ability to utilise other resources: increases of 69 man-days available per hectare (for family workers) and of 0.47 hectares in farm size were observed in the treated group relative to the untreated group. These results illustrate the key role of the coping process in masking the direct economic effects of disease. The benefit of reducing the burden of disease in rice production areas was confirmed through provision of additional utility to households by increasing the time available for leisure activities or for work. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

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  • Audibert, Martine & Etard, Jean-Francois, 1998. "Impact of Schistosomiasis on Rice Output and Farm Inputs in Mali," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 7(2), pages 185-207, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:7:y:1998:i:2:p:185-207

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Christophe Dumont, 2000. "Estimer la relation entre invalidité et emploi dans le cas de Madagascar," Working Papers DT/2000/05, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
    2. Andrew Dillon & Jed Friedman & Pieter Serneels, 2014. "Health information, treatment, and worker productivity: Experimental evidence from malaria testing and treatment among Nigerian sugarcane cutters," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 14-05, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    3. World Bank, 2007. "Niger - Accelerating Growth and Achieving the Millennium Development Goals : Diagnosis and the Policy Agenda," World Bank Other Operational Studies 7658, The World Bank.
    4. Martine Audibert, 1997. "Technical Inefficiency Effects Among Paddy Farmers in the Villages of the ‘Office du Niger’, Mali, West Africa," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 379-394, November.
    5. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4934 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Larochelle, Catherine & Dalton, Timothy J., 2006. "Transient Health Shocks and Agricultural Labor Demand in Rice-producing Households in Mali," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25314, International Association of Agricultural Economists.

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