Bride Wealth and Household Security in Rural Zimbabwe
In this paper we ask why Zimbabwean households pay bride wealth in instalments rather than a lump sum on the date of marriage. We also pose the question why the type of cattle that has to be paid is not exactly specified. Starting from the observation that in rural Zimbabwe risk markets are absent we show that flexibility in both timing and type of bride wealth payment enhances household security beyond what is feasible through income pooling between relatives related through marriage. The additional security results from the creation of a large pool of means-conditional, enforceable claims on assets that are vital for income generation and consumption smoothing purposes. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 11 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Phone: +44-(0)1865 271084
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://www.jae.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jafrec:v:11:y:2002:i:1:p:114-145. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.