Critical masses in the decollectivisation of post-Soviet agriculture
Decollectivisation in post-Soviet agriculture has generally been slow except for islands of complete individualisation. Our model interlinks two types of critical mass phenomena that can explain these outcomes. First, positive network externalities reshape decollectivisation incentives after a sufficient number of reform pioneers shift to private farming. Second, workers have preferences for behaving in conformity with their social reference group. This allows collective farm managers interested in cementing their own power to manipulate reference groups by limiting workers' horizons. We provide empirical support with a threshold regression based on a unique data set of regional reform outcomes in Moldova. Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2009; all rights reserved. For permissions, please email email@example.com, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 36 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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