Labor Market Search and Optimal Retirement Policy
A popular and long-standing view is that social security is a means for young, unemployed people to "purchase" jobs from older workers. Can social security, by encouraging retirement and hence creating job vacancies for the young, improve the allocation of workers to jobs? Maybe, according to a standard model of labor market search, but public retirement programs currently pay the elderly substantially more than their jobs are worth. An important effect is that retirement reduces the value of other vacant jobs. Our results imply that recent reforms aimed at reducing retirement incentives are likely to improve labor market efficiency. (JEL J41, H55, J64, J26) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 42 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Casey B Mulligan, 2000.
"Can Monopoly Unionism Explain Publically Induced Retirement?,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
157, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Casey B. Mulligan, 2000. "Can Monopoly Unionism Explain Publicly Induced Retirement?," NBER Working Papers 7680, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.