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Habitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the U.S. Steel Industry: An EM Algorithm Pooling Approach

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  • Morck, Randall
  • Sepanski, Jungsywan
  • Yeung, Bernard

Abstract

Using U.S. steel firm data, we find that lobbying for import protection appears to be habit-forming. To identify heterogeneity in lobbying behavior among firms, we use an expectation-maximization algorithm to sort our firms into groups with different propensities to lobby and estimate the determinants of lobbying in each group. A two-pool model emerges: occasional lobbyers' lobbying depends on their market performance, and habitual lobbyers' lobbying only depends on past lobbying. The latter tends to be larger steel firms whose business is more focused in steel. Our evidence is consistent with dynamic economies of scale in protection seeking breeding protection-dependent firms. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Morck, Randall & Sepanski, Jungsywan & Yeung, Bernard, 2001. "Habitual and Occasional Lobbyers in the U.S. Steel Industry: An EM Algorithm Pooling Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 365-378, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:3:p:365-78
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    Cited by:

    1. Kokko, Ari & Gustavsson Tingvall, Patrik & Videnord, Josefin, 2017. "Which Antidumping Cases Reach the WTO?," Ratio Working Papers 286, The Ratio Institute.
    2. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Wilson, Wesley W., 2010. "Foreign subsidization and excess capacity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 200-211, March.
    3. Blonigen, Bruce A., 2006. "Working the system: Firm learning and the antidumping process," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 715-731, September.
    4. Cerasa, Andrea & Buscaglia, Daniela, 2019. "A hedonic model of import steel prices: Is the EU market integrated?," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 241-249.
    5. Stephen J. Decanio & Catherine S. Norman, 2005. "Economics Of The “Critical Use” Of Methyl Bromide Under The Montreal Protocol," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 376-393, July.
    6. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Sandkamp, Alexander, 2020. "The trade effects of anti-dumping duties: Firm-level evidence from China," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    7. Y. Hossein Farzin & Jinhua Zhao, 2003. "Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against Environmental Regulation," Working Papers 2003.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    8. Stefano Schiavo & Chiara Tomasi & Min Zhu, 2021. "Anti-dumping activities against China: patterns and effects," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 38(1), pages 7-30, April.
    9. Urska Kosi & Antonia Reither, 2014. "Determinants of Corporate Participation in the IFRS 4 (Insurance Contracts) Replacement Process," Accounting in Europe, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 89-112, June.
    10. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2004. "Family Control and the Rent–Seeking Society," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 28(4), pages 391-409, July.
    11. Zheng, Weiting & Ang, Siah Hwee & Singh, Kulwant, 2022. "The interface of market and nonmarket strategies: Political ties and strategic competitive actions," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(4).
    12. ByBenjamin M. Blau & Todd G. Griffith & Ryan J. Whitby, 2022. "Lobbying and lending by banks around the financial crisis by," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(3), pages 377-397, September.

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