IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Incentives to Reduce Crop Trait Durability


  • Stefan Ambec
  • Corinne Langinier
  • Stéphane Lemarié


To reduce the competition from farmers who self-produce seed, an inbred line seed producer can switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two-period framework, we first investigate the impact of crop durability on self-production, pricing and switching decisions. Second, we study how the introduction of a fee paid by self-producing farmers affects those decisions. We find that the monopolist may produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more surplus from farmers. Further, the introduction of a self-production fee improves efficiency. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Ambec & Corinne Langinier & Stéphane Lemarié, 2008. "Incentives to Reduce Crop Trait Durability," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 90(2), pages 379-391.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:90:y:2008:i:2:p:379-391

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-332, April.
    2. Alston, Julian M. & Venner, Raymond J., 2002. "The effects of the US Plant Variety Protection Act on wheat genetic improvement," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 527-542, May.
    3. Michael Waldman, 1996. "Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 583-595, Autumn.
    4. Lence, Sergio H. & Hayes, Dermot J. & McCunn, Alan & Smith, Stephen & Niebur, William S., 2005. "Welfare Impacts of Intellectual Property Protection in the Seed Industry," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12434, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    5. Kesan, Jay P. & Gallo, Andres A., 2005. "Insecure Property Rights and Plant Varieties: Effects on the Market for Seeds in Argentina," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19199, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June.
    7. Jeremy Bulow, 1986. "An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(4), pages 729-749.
    8. Alan McCunn & Stephen Smith & William S. Niebur, 2005. "Welfare Impacts of Intellectual Property Protection in the Seed Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 87(4), pages 951-968.
    9. Perrin, Richard K. & Fulginiti, Lilyan E., 2002. "Dynamic Pricing Of Genetically Modified Crop Traits," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19656, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    10. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
    11. Diana M. Burton & H. Alan Love & Gokhan Ozertan & Curtis R. Taylor, 2005. "Property Rights Protection of Biotechnology Innovations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 779-812, December.
    12. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 131-154, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Khachaturyan, Marianna & Yiannaka, Amalia, 2012. "The Market Acceptance And Welfare Impacts Of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (Gurts)," 2012 Conference, August 18-24, 2012, Foz do Iguacu, Brazil 126880, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Hervouet, Adrien & Langinier, Corinne, 2015. "Plant Breeders’ Rights, Patents and Incentives to Innovate," Working Papers 2015-7, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    3. Eaton, Derek, 2015. "Innovation and IPRs for Agricultural Crop Varieties as Intermediate Goods," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 211581, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    4. Khachaturyan, Marianna & Yiannaka, Amalia, 2006. "The Market Acceptance and Welfare Impacts of Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs)," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21329, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    5. Derek Eaton, 2013. "Innovation and IPRs in the Agricultural Seed Sector," CIES Research Paper series 19-2013, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    6. Baudry Marc & Hervouet Adrien, 2016. "Innovation in the Seed Market: The Role of IPRs and Commercialization Rules," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 51-68, May.
    7. Eaton, Derek, 2014. "A model of IPRs in the international supply chain of seeds and agricultural production," 2014 International Congress, August 26-29, 2014, Ljubljana, Slovenia 182643, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    8. Marc Baudry & Adrien Hervouet, 2014. "Promoting innovation on the seed market and biodiversity: the role of IPRs and commercialisation rules," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-32, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:90:y:2008:i:2:p:379-391. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.