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From Contractual Approach Of Firm To Theories Of Knowledge

  • Diamandescu Andrei

    ()

    (Universitatea Nicolae Titulescu, Stiinte Economice)

  • Grigore Maria Zenovia

    ()

    (Universitatea Nicolae Titulescu, Stiinte Economice)

Registered author(s):

    The object of contractual theories is describing exchange relation between agents, considering institutional and informational restriction in which they evolve. From trials of removing insufficiency in contractual theories new representations gradually

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    Article provided by University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics in its journal The Journal of the Faculty of Economics - Economic.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2009)
    Issue (Month): 1 (May)
    Pages: 295-301

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    Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:295-301
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    1. Furubotn, Eirik G & Pejovich, Svetozar, 1972. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 1137-62, December.
    2. Cheung, Steven N S, 1969. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 23-42, April.
    3. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
    4. Jensen, Michael C & Meckling, William H, 1979. "Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 469-506, October.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 1994. "The Nature Of Man," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 7(2), pages 4-19.
    7. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
    8. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
    9. Michael C. Jensen, 1994. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, And The Failure Of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 6(4), pages 4-23.
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