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Bidding Behavior in Austrian Treasury Bond Auctions




To issue Treasury securities by auctions is a common method in many countries all over the world. The auction mechanisms used vary across countries. As our understanding of bidder behavior in Treasury auctions is still rather limited it is not surprising that the question which auction mechanism should be chosen is still unresolved. In this study, we analyze the bidding behavior in Austrian Treasury bond auctions, using a dataset which contains all bids submitted by each bidder as well as the results of 137 Austrian Treasury auctions from February 1991 to May 2006. Bidders in bond auctions have various means to react to changing market conditions: They may change the degree of bid shading, the quantity of Treasury bonds demanded and the dispersion of their bids. This paper aims to investigate how bidders adjust their strategies to varying uncertainty in the bond market, to different numbers of participating bidders and to changes in the volume of bond issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Helmut Elsinger & Christine Zulehner, 2007. "Bidding Behavior in Austrian Treasury Bond Auctions," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 2, pages 109-125.
  • Handle: RePEc:onb:oenbmp:y:2007:i:2:b:6

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    Cited by:

    1. Pamela Cardozo, 2013. "Bidders’ Behaviour in Government Securities Auctions: A case study for Colombia," Borradores de Economia 760, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    2. Zulehner, Christine, 2009. "Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 33-42, January.
    3. Pamela Cardozo, 2013. "Bidders´ Behaviour in Government Securities Auctions: A case study for Colombia," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 010501, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.

    More about this item


    treasury auctions; discriminatory price auctions; bid shading; intra-bidder dispersion;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)


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