Indecisiveness aversion and preference for commitment
We present a system of behavioral axioms for preferences over menus that is motivated by three assumptions. First, the decision maker is uncertain ex ante (i.e. at the time of choosing a menu) about her ex post (i.e. at the time of choosing an option within her chosen menu) preferences over options, and she anticipates that this subjective uncertainty will only resolve after the ex post stage. Second, she is averse to ex post indecisiveness (i.e. to having to choose between options that she cannot rank with certainty). Third, when evaluating a menu she discards options that are dominated (i.e. inferior to another option whatever her ex post preferences may be) and restricts attention to the undominated ones. Under these assumptions, the decision maker has a preference for commitment in the sense of preferring menus with fewer undominated alternatives. We derive a representation in which the decision maker's uncertainty about her ex post preferences is captured by means of a subjective state space, which in turn determines which options are undominated in a given menu, and in which the decision maker fears, whenever indecisive, to choose an option that will turn out to be the worst (undominated) one according to the realization of her ex post preferences.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Klaus Nehring, 1999. "Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 101-120, January.
- Todd Sarver, 2008. "Anticipating Regret: Why Fewer Options May Be Better," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(2), pages 263-305, 03.
- Kreps, David M, 1979. "A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 565-77, May.
- Ortoleva, Pietro, 2008.
"The Price of Flexibility: Towards a Theory of Thinking Aversion,"
12242, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ortoleva, Pietro, 2013. "The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of Thinking Aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 903-934.
- Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2005.
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2005-005, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2006. "Temptation–Driven Preferences," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-024, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Barton Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 2006. "Temptation–Driven Preferences," Discussion Papers 1423, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Juan Dubra & Fabio Maccheroni & Efe Oki, 2001.
"Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom,"
ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series
11-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Dubra, Juan & Maccheroni, Fabio & Ok, Efe A., 2004. "Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 118-133, March.
- Juan Dubra & Fabio Maacheroni & Efe A. Ok, 2001. "Expected Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1294, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Epstein, Larry G. & Marinacci, Massimo & Seo, Kyoungwon, 2007. "Coarse contingencies and ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
- W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999.
"Temptation and Self-Control,"
Princeton Economic Theory Papers
99f1, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Eddie eckel & Barton L Lipman & Aldo Rustichini & Todd Sarver, 2005. "Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space: Corrigendum," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-042, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Guerdjikova, Ani & Zimper, Alexander, 2006.
"Flexibility of Choice versus Reduction of Ambiguity,"
06-14, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Ani Guerdjikova & Alexander Zimper, 2008. "Flexibility of choice versus reduction of ambiguity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 507-526, April.
- Ani Guerdjikova & Alexander Zimper, 2005. "Flexibility of Choice Versus Reduction of Ambiguity," Working Papers 40, Economic Research Southern Africa.
- Haluk Ergin & Todd Sarver, 2010. "A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(4), pages 1285-1339, 07.
- Ozdenoren, Emre, 2002. "Completing the State Space with Subjective States," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 531-539, August.
- Eddie Dekel, 1997.
"A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies,"
1202, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L & Rustichini, Aldo, 2001. "Representing Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 891-934, July.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Indifference or indecisiveness? Choice-theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 61-86, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:72:y:2012:i:1:p:1-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.