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Coarse contingencies and ambiguity

Author

Listed:
  • Epstein, Larry G.

    () (Boston University)

  • Marinacci, Massimo

    () (Universita di Torino)

  • Seo, Kyoungwon

    () (University of Rochester)

Abstract

The paper considers an agent who must choose an action today under uncertainty about the consequence of any chosen action but without having in mind a complete list of all the contingencies that could influence outcomes. She conceives of some relevant (subjective) contingencies but she is aware that these contingencies are coarse---they leave out some details that may affect outcomes. Though she may not be able to describe these finer details, she is aware that they exist and this may affect her behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Epstein, Larry G. & Marinacci, Massimo & Seo, Kyoungwon, 2007. "Coarse contingencies and ambiguity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
  • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:223
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Spyros Galanis, 2013. "Unawareness of theorems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 41-73, January.
    2. Burkhard Schipper, 2010. "Revealed Unawareness," Working Papers 105, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Marie-Louise Vierø, 2009. "Exactly what happens after the Anscombe–Aumann race?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 175-212, November.
    4. Bracha, Anat & Brown, Donald J., 2012. "Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 67-80.
    5. Nascimento, Leandro & Riella, Gil, 2011. "A class of incomplete and ambiguity averse preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 728-750, March.
    6. Higashi, Youichiro & Hyogo, Kazuya & Takeoka, Norio, 2009. "Subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1015-1053, May.
    7. repec:bos:wpaper:wp2013-001 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ortoleva, Pietro, 2013. "The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of Thinking Aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 903-934.
    9. Anat Bracha & Donald J. Brown, 2008. "Affective Decision Making and the Ellsberg Paradox," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1667, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. Epstein, Larry G. & Seo, Kyoungwon, 2015. "Exchangeable capacities, parameters and incomplete theories," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 879-917.
    11. Nascimento, Leandro, 2011. "Zhou’s aggregation theorems with multiple welfare weights," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 654-658.
    12. Riella, Gil, 2013. "Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2467-2482.
    13. Takashi Hayashi, 2012. "Expanding state space and extension of beliefs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 591-604, October.
    14. Epstein, Larry G. & Seo, Kyoungwon, 2009. "Subjective states: A more robust model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 408-427, November.
    15. Eric Danan & Ani Guerdjikova & Alexander Zimper, 2012. "Indecisiveness aversion and preference for commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 1-13.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Uncertainty; states of the world; ambiguity; coarse contingencies;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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