IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v203y2025i3d10.1007_s11127-024-01213-w.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The implementability of liberalism

Author

Listed:
  • Héctor Hermida-Rivera

    (Budapest University of Technology and Economics)

Abstract

This note shows that under the unrestricted domain, there exists a choice liberal and Nash implementable social choice rule if and only if there are at least three players and the outcome set is at least twice as large as the player set. A social choice rule is choice liberal if and only if for every player, there exists at least one pair of outcomes such that if this player strictly prefers one over the other, the one he prefers is socially desirable and the other one is not. A social choice rule is Nash implementable if and only if there exists a mechanism such that at every preference profile, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of socially desirable ones. The proof constructs an intuitive Nash implementing mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Héctor Hermida-Rivera, 2025. "The implementability of liberalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 203(3), pages 493-501, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:203:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01213-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-024-01213-w
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-024-01213-w
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-024-01213-w?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Liberalism; Nash equilibrium; Mechanism; Implementation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:203:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-024-01213-w. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.