Environmental Quality, Medical Care Demand and Environmental Tax Interactions
Assuming that improvements in environmental quality lead to lower demand for medical care, it has been shown that general-equilibrium interactions with the tax-distorted labor market reduce the benefits from such improvements, and thus lower the second-best optimal environmental tax. This paper provides some insights on how the link between environmental quality, individual’s health capital, and the demand for medical care affects the analysis of pollution taxes. The paper develops structural conditions under which improvements in environmental quality decrease/increase the demand for medical care and discusses their implications for environmental tax interactions. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007
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Volume (Year): 37 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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