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A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense

Author

Listed:
  • Peter T. Leeson

    (George Mason University)

  • Christopher J. Coyne

    (George Mason University)

  • Thomas K. Duncan

    (Radford University)

Abstract

Market-provided national defense famously suffers from a free-rider problem. According to conventional wisdom, markets must therefore underprovide defense. We argue that conventional wisdom is wrong. The free-rider problem that plagues national defense also plagues national offense, leading markets to underprovide the latter as well. Because national offense is the raison d’etre of national defense, whether or not markets provide the efficient level of defense depends on the severity of the free-rider problem in its production, and thus defense’s underprovision, relative to the severity of the free-rider problem in the production of offense, and thus offense’s underprovision. Where the free-rider problem confronted in producing national offense is more severe than that confronted in producing national defense, markets produce the efficient level of national defense. ______________________________________________________

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T. Leeson & Christopher J. Coyne & Thomas K. Duncan, 2014. "A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 29(2), pages 51-55.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1079
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stringham, Edward Peter, 2015. "Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199365166.
    2. Garrett R. Wood, 2019. "Crowdfunding defense," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 451-467, September.
    3. Brian Meehan, 2017. "Do Economies of Scale Exist in Private Protection? Evaluating Nozick's "Invisible Hand"," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 32(2), pages 83-91.
    4. repec:jpe:journl:1286 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Maltsev, Vladimir, 2023. "The economics of military innovation under anarchy: The case of the Ukrainian Civil War of 1917–1921," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 180-190.
    6. repec:jpe:journl:1284 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. J. R. Clark & Benjamin Powell, 2019. "The ‘minimal’ state reconsidered: governance on the margin," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 119-130, June.
    8. A. Yudanov & O. Pyrkina & E. Bekker., 2016. "On the limits of unsolvability of the "free rider problem"," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 11.
    9. repec:jpe:journl:1320 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Caleb S. Fuller & David S. Lucas, 2017. "Pricing Political Rallies," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 271-278, June.
    11. Geloso, Vincent J. & Salter, Alexander W., 2020. "State capacity and economic development: Causal mechanism or correlative filter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 372-385.

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