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Minimum Capital Adequacy Ratios for Banks. An Obstacle to Investment Finance of Poorly Capitalized Firms? / Eigenkapitalnormen für Banken. Ein Hindernis für die Investitionsfinanzierung von kapitalschwachen Unternehmen?

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  • Vollmer Uwe

    (Universität Leipzig, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Geld und Währung, Marschnerstr. 31, D-04109 Leipzig)

Abstract

Existing institutions of banking regulation force banks to meet minimum capital adequacy ratios. These regulations intend to guarantee the solvency of banks and to protect depositors against excessive risk-taking by bank-owners. By the same token, however, they may have consequences for investment finance. The paper asks in a standard principal-agent-setting what these consequences are and argues that excessive minimum capital adequacy ratios form an obstacle to investment finance of poorly capitalized firms which do not have access to direct finance via capital markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Vollmer Uwe, 2001. "Minimum Capital Adequacy Ratios for Banks. An Obstacle to Investment Finance of Poorly Capitalized Firms? / Eigenkapitalnormen für Banken. Ein Hindernis für die Investitionsfinanzierung von kapitalsch," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 221(5-6), pages 577-591, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:221:y:2001:i:5-6:p:577-591
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2001-5-608
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    References listed on IDEAS

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