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Market Power in Regional Retail Gasoline Markets? An Empirical Analysis / Marktmacht auf regionalen Märkten. Eine empirische Analyse am Beispiel des Kraftstoffmarktes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Author

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  • Drescher Klaus

    (Department of Agricultural Economics, Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel, Olshausenstr. 40, D-24118 Kiel/Germany)

  • McNamara Kevin

    (Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, 1145 Krannert Building, West Lafayette, IN 47907-1145/USA)

Abstract

This article discusses the relationship between gasoline prices and market structure. A Cournot model was used to test if national oil companies have local market power. The commonly held belief that national oil companies in Germany excercise market power was not empirically supported despite high national and regional concentration rates in the gasoline retail market. However, a further concentration of gas stations might lead to a change of the results in the future.

Suggested Citation

  • Drescher Klaus & McNamara Kevin, 2001. "Market Power in Regional Retail Gasoline Markets? An Empirical Analysis / Marktmacht auf regionalen Märkten. Eine empirische Analyse am Beispiel des Kraftstoffmarktes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 221(1), pages 1-13, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:jns:jbstat:v:221:y:2001:i:1:p:1-13
    DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2001-0102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Cotterill, Ronald W, 1986. "Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(3), pages 379-386, August.
    6. Phillips, Almarin, 1976. "A Critique of Empirical Studies of Relations between Market Structure and Profitability," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 241-249, June.
    7. Andrea Shepard, 1993. "Contractual Form, Retail Price, and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline Retailing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 58-77, Spring.
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