Public Debt in a Federation - Growth and Stability / Staatsverschuldung in einer Föderation - Wachstum und Stabilität
In this paper a neoclassical growth model is used to analyze public debt in a growing economy with two levels of government. The main focus is on the existence and the stability of long run equilibria in a growing federal state. It is shown that the equilibrium in a federation with two levels of government is more likely to be unstable than the equilibrium in a centralized state. Moreover, if the saving rate is below the golden rule, the equilibrium will be unambiguously unstable. In order to avoid instability, sufficient flexibility at all levels of government in federations and confederations such as the European union is required.
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Volume (Year): 220 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Heinz-Dieter Wenzel & Matthias Wrede, 1993. "Golden Rule Fiscal Policy," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 129(II), pages 123-150, June.
- Kneebone, Ronald D., 1989. "Does fiscal policy matter in a federal economy?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 599-607.
- Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jurgen, 1995.
"Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers
233417, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
- Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 1247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barry Eichengreen and Jurgen von Hagen., 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C95-056, University of California at Berkeley.
- Ronald D. Kneebone, 1989. "On Macro-economic Instability under a Monetarist Policy Rule in a Federal Economy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 673-685, August.
- Robert M. Solow, 1956. "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 65-94.
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