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Degrees of Separation, Social Learning, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Small-World Network

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Abstract

We analyze a novel agent-based model of a social network in which agents make contributions to others conditional upon the social distance, which we measure in terms of the “degrees of separation†between the two players. On the basis of a simple imitation model, the emerging strategy profile is characterized by high levels of cooperation with those who are directly connected to the agent and lower but positive levels of cooperation with those who are indirectly connected to the agent. Increasing maximum interaction distance decreases cooperation with close neighbors but increases cooperation with distant neighbors for a net negative effect. On the other hand, allowing agents to learn and imitate socially distant neighbors increases cooperation for all types of interaction. Combining greater interaction distance with greater learning distance leads to a positive change in the total social welfare produced by the agents’ contributions.

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  • Nicholas Seltzer & Oleg Smirnov, 2015. "Degrees of Separation, Social Learning, and the Evolution of Cooperation in a Small-World Network," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 18(4), pages 1-12.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:2014-100-3
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    1. Hisashi Ohtsuki & Christoph Hauert & Erez Lieberman & Martin A. Nowak, 2006. "A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks," Nature, Nature, vol. 441(7092), pages 502-505, May.
    2. Yen-Sheng Chiang, 2013. "Cooperation Could Evolve in Complex Networks when Activated Conditionally on Network Characteristics," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 16(2), pages 1-6.
    3. Shade T. Shutters & David Hales, 2013. "Tag-Mediated Altruism is Contingent on How Cheaters Are Defined," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 16(1), pages 1-4.
    4. E. Ostrom, 2010. "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 1, pages 5-52.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gao, Lin, 2017. "Between Trust and Performance: Exploring Socio-Economic Mechanisms on Directed Weighted Regular Ring with Agent-Based Modeling," MPRA Paper 78428, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Deng, Yunsheng & Zhang, Jihui, 2021. "The role of the preferred neighbor with the expected payoff on cooperation in spatial public goods game under optimal strategy selection mechanism," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 584(C).
    3. Fengjie Xie & Jing Shi & Jun Lin, 2017. "Impact of interaction style and degree on the evolution of cooperation on Barabási–Albert scale-free network," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(8), pages 1-15, August.
    4. Gao, Lin, 2016. "Trust and Performance: Exploring Socio-Economic Mechanisms in the “Deep” Network Structure with Agent-Based Modeling," MPRA Paper 75214, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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