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Gossip, Sexual Recombination and the El Farol Bar: Modelling the Emergence of Heterogeneity

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Abstract

An investigation into the conditions conducive to the emergence of heterogeneity amoung agents is presented. This is done by using a model of creative artificial agents to investigate some of the possibilities. The simulation is based on Brian Arthurs `El Farol Bar model but extended so that the agents also learn and communicate. The learning and communication is implemented using an evolutionary process acting upon a population of strategies inside each agent. This evolutionary learning process is based on a Genetic Programming algorithm. This is chosen to make the agents as creative as possible and thus allow the outside edge of the simulation trajectory to be explored. A detailed case study from the simulations show how the agents have differentiated so that by the end of the run they had taken on qualitatively different roles. It provides some evidence that the introduction of a flexible learning process and an expressive internal representation has facilitated the emergence of this heterogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Edmonds, 1999. "Gossip, Sexual Recombination and the El Farol Bar: Modelling the Emergence of Heterogeneity," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 2(3), pages 1-2.
    • Handle: RePEc:jas:jasssj:1999-2-1
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    1. Arthur, W Brian, 1994. "Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 406-411, May.
    2. Scott Moss & Helen Gaylard & Steve Wallis & Bruce Edmonds, 1998. "SDML: A Multi-Agent Language for Organizational Modelling," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 43-69, March.
    3. Helen Gaylard, 1996. "A Cognitive Approach to Modelling Structural Change," Discussion Papers 96-20, Manchester Metropolitan University, Centre for Policy Modelling.
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    2. Shu-Heng Chen & Umberto Gostoli, 2017. "Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(1), pages 59-93, April.

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