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Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Ronald M. Harstad

    (Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey)

  • Michael H. Rothkopf

    (Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey)

Abstract

When bidders have a common value or strongly affiliated values for an object or contract being auctioned by sealed bids, it is possible that the maker of a rational and apparently winning bid would, upon learning the competing bids, prefer losing the auction to honoring his bid. The ability to withdraw a bid, perhaps at a cost, in such circumstances provides a form of “winner's curse insurance.” Bidding with such insurance is analyzed, obtaining the general condition for rational bid withdrawal and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with more aggressive bidding. Next, we define a “compensation penalties” bid withdrawal penalty scheme and show that with it the bid-taker is better off on the average than if bid withdrawal is impossible. Finally, we find equilibrium bidding and withdrawal strategies in a multiplicative model as a function of the magnitude of the bid withdrawal penalty and of the bid-taker's likelihood, after a withdrawal, of honoring the second-best bid. This model has cases in which allowing withdrawal at a cost is in the bid-taker's interest and ones in which it is not.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf, 1995. "Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 43(6), pages 983-994, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:oropre:v:43:y:1995:i:6:p:983-994
    DOI: 10.1287/opre.43.6.983
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2019. "Auctions with limited liability through default or resale," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 51-74.
    2. Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Saša Pekeč, 2008. "Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 367-380, October.
    3. Lamping, Jennifer, 2007. "The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk," MPRA Paper 24375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Xiao, Haohan & Xu, Min & Wang, Shuaian, 2024. "Auction-based parking mechanisms considering withdrawal behaviors," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 81-93.
    5. Yizhaq Minchuk & Aner Sela, 2020. "Contests with insurance," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 1-22, June.
    6. Wei-Shiun Chang & Timothy C. Salmon & Krista J. Saral, 2016. "Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation And Wealth Constraints," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1684-1704, July.
    7. Michael H. Rothkopf & Sunju Park, 2001. "An Elementary Introduction to Auctions," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 31(6), pages 83-97, December.
    8. Robert F. Bordley & Elena Katok & L. Robin Keller, 2010. "Honoring Michael H. Rothkopf's Legacy of Rigor and Relevance in Auction Theory: From the Editors," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 1-4, March.
    9. Kris De Jaegher & Michal Soltes & Vitezslav Titl, 2023. "Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp757, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    10. Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2021. "Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 345-374, December.

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