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Investment Decisions and Normalization with Incomplete Markets: A Pitfall in Aggregating Shareholders' Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Luigi Ventura

    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universita La Sapienza, Italy)

Abstract

Profit maximization is not a well defined objective when markets are incomplete. Several criteria of investment choice have therefore been put forward in the literature, some of which crucially hinge upon aggregation of shareholders' preferences, as is the case with the criteria proposed by Dreze (1974) and Grossman and Hart (1979). This note shows that these criteria are normalization dependent, i.e., their outcome depends on the good chosen to express individuals' marginal rates of substitution.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Ventura, 2004. "Investment Decisions and Normalization with Incomplete Markets: A Pitfall in Aggregating Shareholders' Preferences," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 3(1), pages 21-28, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:21-28
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean & Vial, Jean-Philippe, 1972. "Oligopoly "A la cournot" in a general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 381-400, June.
    2. Peter M. DeMarzo, 1993. "Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 713-734.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mukherjee, Rahul, 2015. "Institutions, Corporate Governance and Capital Flows," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 338-359.
    2. Amarjit Gill, 2020. "Impact of Family Control on Intrafamily Succession Intention and Firm Investment," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 19(3), pages 237-256, December.
    3. Amarjit Gill & Harvinder S. Mand & Afshin Amiraslany & John D. Obradovich, 2019. "The Impact of Internal Financing Sources and Bank Financing on Information Technology Investment," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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