An Equilibrium Search Model When Firms Observe Workers' Employment Status
This article considers an equilibrium search model, where firms post wages using information on workers' employment status. Earnings differentials between workers of different employment statuses are driven by firms' ability to discriminate workers' reservation wages. I study how these wage policies depend on firms' and workers' characteristics, and how these policies affect the wage distribution. The model delivers new predictions for the amount of wage dispersion that can be generated with search models and provides a better representation of the left tail of the wage distribution in the presence of a legal minimum wage than standard equilibrium search models. Copyright � (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 50 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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