IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ier/iecrev/v34y1993i4p873-901.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Bower, Anthony G

Abstract

The contracting literature has emphasized the optimality of using certain contracting instruments, such as multiple cost observations, full commitment, self-selection, and competition. A two-period procurement model is constructed incorporating all of the instruments and optimal contracts are characterized. Numerical examples suggest that the marginal benefits of full commitment, self-selection, and multiple cost observations are small, while the benefits of competition are larger. To obtain some evidence on contracting costs, defense contracting is reviewed. It indicates that using these instruments is very costly, thus calling into question the optimality of using all of the procurement instruments. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Bower, Anthony G, 1993. "Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(4), pages 873-901, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:4:p:873-901
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%28199311%2934%3A4%3C873%3APPACE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pal Debashis & Topolyan Iryna & Sappington David E. M., 2022. "Pareto Gains from Limiting Compensation Options," IZA Journal of Labor Economics, Sciendo & Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 12(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
    3. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2015. "Optimal auction design under non-commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 854-890.
    4. Leon Yang Chu & David E.M. Sappington, 2009. "Implementing high‐powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 296-316, June.
    5. Leon Yang Chu & David E. M. Sappington, 2007. "Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 419-428, March.
    6. Kopsakangas-Savolainen, Maria & Svento, Rauli, 2010. "Comparing welfare effects of different regulation schemes: An application to the electricity distribution industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(11), pages 7370-7377, November.
    7. repec:hal:psewpa:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. David P. Brown and David E. M. Sappington, 2018. "Optimal Procurement of Distributed Energy Resources," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 5).
    9. Fuqiang Zhang, 2010. "Procurement Mechanism Design in a Two-Echelon Inventory System with Price-Sensitive Demand," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 12(4), pages 608-626, August.
    10. Brown, David P. & Sappington, David E. M., 2023. "Designing Incentive Regulation in the Electricity Sector," Working Papers 2023-10, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    11. Leon Yang Chu & David E. M. Sappington, 2015. "Contracting with Private Knowledge of Production Capacity," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 752-785, October.
    12. Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья) & Morozov, Anton (Морозов, Антон), 2018. "Markets in the Field of the State Defense Order: Opportunities and Limitations for the Development of Competition [Рынки В Сфере Государственного Оборонного Заказа: Возможности И Ограничения Для Ра," Working Papers 061811, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    13. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
    14. William P. Rogerson, 2003. "Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 919-926, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:4:p:873-901. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deupaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.