Oligopoly Equilibria When Firms Have Local Knowledge of Demand
This paper investigates the existence of oligopoly equilibria when firms arrive, through local price experiments, at a correct estimation of their demand curves in a neighborhood of a given statu s quo. The author provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a local Nash equilibrium, defined as a point where each firm is at a local maximum of its profit function, given the prices charged by th e other firms. He also provides two examples, one of a duopoly with l ocal Nash equilibria but no Nash equilibria and the other of a duopol y with no local Nash equilibria. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 29 (1988)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297|
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598 Email: |