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Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Credibility Based On Arimbi (Aggregate Rational Inflation ? Targeting Model for Bank Indonesia); Lessons From Indonesian Experience

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Listed:
  • Harmanta

    (Bank Indonesia)

  • M. Barik Bathaluddin

    (Bank Indonesia)

  • Jati Waluyo

    (Bank Indonesia)

Abstract

This paper try to assess role of credibility in the implementation of inflation targeting framework in Indonesia. It illustrates how credibility may play an important role in the evolution of the Indonesian monetary policy. Knowing the degree of credibility would beneficial for Bank Indonesia (BI) to understand how to adjust policy instrument to achieve a long-term inflation target. Scaled from zero (purely not credible) to one (perfect credibility), our quantitative measurements found that credibility index for Indonesian monetary policy converge to around 0.5. Refer to projection and simulation results in this paper, the study shows expectation inflation of economic agents is strongly influenced by monetary policy credibility. The more credible the monetary policy, the faster inflation expectation would anchor to its target. In addition, high credibility also increase the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission since the disinflation cost represented by sacrifice ratio is lower. Under imperfect credibility the central bank prefer to attain its inflation target gradually, and if the credibility stock is doubled, then achieving its long-term inflation target required a lot shorter time (approximately 0.4 periods than the baseline).

Suggested Citation

  • Harmanta & M. Barik Bathaluddin & Jati Waluyo, 2011. "Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Credibility Based On Arimbi (Aggregate Rational Inflation ? Targeting Model for Bank Indonesia); Lessons From Indonesian Experience," Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Bank Indonesia, vol. 13(3), pages 271-306, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:idn:journl:v:13:y:2011:i:3f:p:271-306
    DOI: https://doi.org/10.21098/bemp.v13i3.394
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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