IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ibn/ijefaa/v13y2021i4p40.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Public Expenditure Management and Political Budget Cycles: The Case of Colima City Council 2009-2018

Author

Listed:
  • Omar Alejandro Pérez-Cruz
  • Edgar Alfredo Nande-Vázquez
  • Juan Carlos Martínez-Verdugo

Abstract

The political budget cycles (PBC), as an evolutionary part of the economic political cycle (EPC), demonstrate the existence of opportunistic practices of economic variables, electoral, and budgetary that the politicians in power operate in their management to continue in office. In this sense, the literature suggests a pattern of opportunistic behavior on voters’ myopia, showing that there is little retrospective memory for voters, allowing the party in power to execute public policies successfully. Thus, the objective of the research is to analyze the existence of political budgetary cycles in the management of investment spending by the City of Colima from the years 2009 to 2018. Thus, the objective of the research is to analyze the existence of political budgetary cycles in the management of investment spending by the City of Colima from the years 2009 to 2018. This was analyzed using the panel data methodology (MCO; EF; EA), to estimate the variables dependent on investment and current expenditure, a dummy variable was introduced to identify the year before the election and to be able to control the influence of the electoral period on each regression. The results show that investment spending is related to election periods, population growth, and the federal social aid budget sector. Current expenditure was only related to population growth. This allows us to explain that spending is a resource that finances public works in the states of Mexico. Thus, this research shows that public works is a public expenditure that the states of Mexico apply more in times of elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Omar Alejandro Pérez-Cruz & Edgar Alfredo Nande-Vázquez & Juan Carlos Martínez-Verdugo, 2021. "Public Expenditure Management and Political Budget Cycles: The Case of Colima City Council 2009-2018," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(4), pages 1-40, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:13:y:2021:i:4:p:40
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijef/article/download/0/0/44920/47532
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijef/article/view/0/44920
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2008. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2203-2220, December.
    2. Brender, Adi, 2003. "The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989-1998," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2187-2205, September.
    3. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338.
    4. Sam Peltzman, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 327-361.
    5. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
    6. MacRae, C Duncan, 1977. "A Political Model of the Business Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(2), pages 239-263, April.
    7. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    8. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 301-314, October.
    9. Toke Aidt & Francisco Veiga & Linda Veiga, 2011. "Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 21-44, July.
    10. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    11. Sakurai, Sergio N. & Menezes, Naercio A., 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Insper Working Papers wpe_117, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    12. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. García, Israel & Hayo, Bernd, 2021. "Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2015. "Public investment and reelection prospects in developed countries," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(2), pages 471-500, October.
    3. Arnt Hopland, 2014. "Voter information and electoral outcomes: the Norwegian list of shame," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 233-255, October.
    4. Florian Dorn, 2021. "Elections and Government Efficiency," ifo Working Paper Series 363, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    5. Bernardo P. Schettini & Rafael Terra, 2020. "Electoral incentives and Public Employees’ Retirement Systems in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 79-103, July.
    6. Klein, Fabio Alvim & Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, 2015. "Term limits and political budget cycles at the local level: evidence from a young democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 21-36.
    7. Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2013. "Voting functions in the EU-15," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 411-428, December.
    8. Balaguer-Coll, Maria Teresa & Brun-Martos, María Isabel & Forte, Anabel & Tortosa-Ausina, Emili, 2015. "Local governments' re-election and its determinants: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 94-108.
    9. Marek Hanusch & Daniel Magleby, 2014. "Popularity, polarization, and political budget cycles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 457-467, June.
    10. Alesina, A. & Passalacqua, A., 2016. "The Political Economy of Government Debt," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2599-2651, Elsevier.
    11. Chortareas, Georgios & Logothetis, Vasileios & Papandreou, Andreas A., 2016. "Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-13.
    12. Sidorkin, Oleg & Vorobyev, Dmitriy, 2018. "Political cycles and corruption in Russian regions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 55-74.
    13. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2011. "Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 233-247, July.
    14. Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Brender, Adi & Blesse, Sebastian & Reingewertz, Yaniv, 2016. "Revenue decentralization, central oversight and the political budget cycle: Evidence from Israel," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-16.
    15. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2015. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01238883, HAL.
    16. Jakob Haan & Jeroen Klomp, 2013. "Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 387-410, December.
    17. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01320586, HAL.
    18. Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko & Menezes, Naercio, 2010. "Opportunistic and Partisan Election Cycles in Brazil: New Evidence at the Municipal Level," Insper Working Papers wpe_208, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    19. Antoine CAZALS & Pierre MANDON, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers 201609, CERDI.
    20. Oleg Sidorkin & Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2015. "Political Risk, Information and Corruption Cycles: Evidence from Russian Regions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp539, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ibn:ijefaa:v:13:y:2021:i:4:p:40. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Canadian Center of Science and Education (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepflch.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.