IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/iab/iabfor/v2013i1p098-103.html

Wirtschaftsnobelpreis 2012: Auf der Suche nach dem passenden Gegenstück

Author

Listed:
  • Stops, Michael

    (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany)

Abstract

"Wie lassen sich verschiedene Akteure auf die bestmögliche Art und Weise zusammenbringen? Dieses zentrale wirtschaftliche Problem haben die US-Ökonomen Lloyd S. Shapley und Alvin E. Roth erforscht. Für die Entwicklung und Anwendung einer Theorie, bestimmte Märkte so zu gestalten, dass sie möglichst effizient und zum Wohle aller Beteiligten funktionieren, erhielten sie den Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2012. Ihre wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse helfen in der Praxis bei der Vergabe von Studienplätzen bis hin zur Verteilung von Spendernieren an Patienten." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

Suggested Citation

  • Stops, Michael, 2013. "Wirtschaftsnobelpreis 2012: Auf der Suche nach dem passenden Gegenstück," IAB-Forum, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 2013(1), pages 98-103.
    • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabfor:v:2013:i:1:p:098-103
    DOI: 10.3278/IFO1301W098
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3278/IFO1301W098
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3278/IFO1301W098?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
    2. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices," NBER Chapters, in: Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, pages 235-271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jiang, Zhishan & Tian, Guoqiang, 2013. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Algorithm," MPRA Paper 57936, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2014.
    3. James Boudreau & Vicki Knoblauch, 2013. "Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 565-589, April.
    4. Gutin, Gregory Z. & Neary, Philip R. & Yeo, Anders, 2024. "Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 244-263.
    5. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2012. "Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference : Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche 15-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    6. Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2017. "Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 78-97.
    7. Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 79-112.
    8. Fuhito Kojima & Parag A. Pathak, 2009. "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 608-627, June.
    9. Litsa Alexandra & Maguet Jean-François, 2012. "College Choice Mechanism: The Respect of the Vagueness of Choices," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201202, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    10. Nobel Prize Committee, 2012. "Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley: Stable allocations and the practice of market design," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2012-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    11. Jaramillo, Paula & Kayı, Çaǧatay & Klijn, Flip, 2013. "Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 693-701.
    12. Gregory Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2022. "Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints," Papers 2204.03989, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    13. Kóczy Á., László, 2009. "Központi felvételi rendszerek. Taktikázás és stabilitás [Central admission systems. Stratagems and stability]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 422-442.
    14. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
    15. Rees-Jones, Alex, 2018. "Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 317-330.
    16. Kühn, Sarah & Duman, Papatya & Hoyer, Britta & Streck, Thomas & Stroh-Maraun, Nadja, 2025. "Non-induced preferences in matching experiments," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 758, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    17. Andre Veski & Kaire Põder, 2016. "Strategies in the Tallinn School Choice Mechanism," Research in Economics and Business: Central and Eastern Europe, Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology, vol. 8(1).
    18. Ismail Saglam, 2021. "The Success of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm Under Heterogenous Preferences with Endogenous Aspirations," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(2), pages 577-591, February.
    19. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2021. "Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 21.11, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    20. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tommy Andersson, 2022. "School Choice," NBER Working Papers 29822, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iab:iabfor:v:2013:i:1:p:098-103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: IAB, Geschäftsbereich Informationsmanagement und Bibliothek (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iabbbde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.