The Complexity and Simulation of Revenue Sharing Negotiation Based on Construction Stakeholders

This paper focuses on the complexity characteristics of a stakeholder’s revenue sharing for time compression in construction projects, such as adopting a life cycle perspective, the preferences of stakeholders, and the adaptability behaviors in the negotiation process. We build an agent-based model on revenue sharing negotiation. Considering that the agents who are in a weak position not only care about their own benefits but also compare their benefits to others, we design an experimental scenario where a contractor has fairness preference based on China’s reality. According to different sympathy and envy coefficients, we can divide the inequity aversion preference into three typical types, and we research how a contractor’s different types of inequity aversion preferences impact revenue sharing coefficient of agreements, results of successful negotiations, and efficiency in negotiations. Results are as follows: it is advantageous for a contractor to maintain a modest inequity aversion for their own earnings and the degree of sympathy preference in inequity aversion has an important impact on the time to reach consensus while the degree of jealousy preference has no obvious effect. If contractors’ sympathy preference is maintained within a moderate range, it will achieve a higher success rate of negotiations in the negotiation process; the success rate of negotiation is affected largely by the agents’ sympathy preference, though it is also influenced by the jealousy preference, but it is not very sensitive.