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Beyond a Spray: Pesticide Application Management in Rural China Based on Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game

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  • Zilu Zhao

    (Business School, Wenzhou University, Wenzhou 325035, China)

  • Bo Li

    (Business School, Wenzhou University, Wenzhou 325035, China)

Abstract

Organic pesticides (OP) produce very little environmental contamination compared with conventional pesticides, but their use is low in rural China. Interest conflicts among participants are analysed for the first time to improve pesticide application management (PAM). Retailers, whose roles are usually little-mentioned, were found to be irreplaceable and so were included in the model as players. A quadrilateral evolutionary game is constructed for PAM and used data from field research in servey representative areas in rural China to estimate the future situation. It demonstrates that OP cannot be chosen by most farmers under the current policy and market environment. The simulation showed that: (i) The probability and economic loss of retailers when providing high-concentration pesticide recommendations positively impact OP application. (ii) The organic certification cost and the successful application probability both benefit environmental recovery in the short term, while the advantages outweigh the disadvantages in the long run. (iii) The cost of strict regulations negatively correlate with OP application; while the purchase price and the corresponding premium provided by intermediates positively/negatively correlates with OP application. This suggests that the environment would be better protected by increasing farmers’ pesticide knowledge, reducing retailers’ monopoly of influence, and providing subsidies and guidance for organic certification. Moreover, shortening the food supply chain and reducing regulatory costs would also help.

Suggested Citation

  • Zilu Zhao & Bo Li, 2022. "Beyond a Spray: Pesticide Application Management in Rural China Based on Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(19), pages 1-25, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:19:p:12096-:d:924067
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Bakker, L. & Sok, J. & van der Werf, W. & Bianchi, F.J.J.A., 2021. "Kicking the Habit: What Makes and Breaks Farmers' Intentions to Reduce Pesticide Use?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 180(C).
    5. Xuesong Zhan & Chaofeng Shao & Rong He & Rongguang Shi, 2021. "Evolution and Efficiency Assessment of Pesticide and Fertiliser Inputs to Cultivated Land in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 18(7), pages 1-21, April.
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